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ABSTRACT
This article shifts the analysis of parliamentary oversight tools to the level of the 
political party, asking how political parties make use of written parliamentary 
questions. It theorises that the use of parliamentary questions is related to the 
ideological and electoral competition between political parties, borrowing from 
theories on issue competition and negative campaigning. It provides an empirical 
test, using data on written questions from the lower house in the Netherlands 
(1994–2014). The analysis shows that parties tend to put questions to ministers 
whose portfolios are salient to them, in line with issue ownership theories. 
Moreover they ask questions of both ministers from parties that are ideologically 
distant and those with whom they have considerable electoral overlap in line with 
studies of negative campaigning.
KEYWORDS legislative studies; parliaments; parliamentary questions; political parties; the netherlands
How do parliamentarians make use of parliamentary oversight tools, in par-
ticular written questions? In the literature on parliamentary questions two 
approaches have been prominent: the first focuses on the use of parliamentary 
questions as an electoral tool for individual MPs (Bailer 2011; Mayhew 1974; 
Russo and Wiberg 2010; Saalfeld 2011). The second examines the relation-
ship between the media agenda and the parliamentary agenda as reflected by 
parliamentary questions (Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2014; Vliegenthart and 
Walgrave 2011; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2010, 2012). Despite the fact that we 
know that MP behaviour reflects the aims and strategies of their parties, most 
of this work aims to explain how many questions individual MPs ask or the 
topics they focus on. Political parties take a back seat in these analyses (but see 
Vliegenthart et al. 2011). This article aims to complement existing perspectives 
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2   S. OTJES AND T. LOUWERSE
by shifting attention to the level of the political party: how do they make use 
of parliamentary questions as a strategic political tool?
Oral and written questions are mostly symbolic, because of their limited 
policy consequences (Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2014). In this way they are 
similar to other forms of political communication, in particular campaign 
communication. Parliamentary party groups use parliamentary questions 
not because they are usually interested in the answers the government pro-
vides, but in order to further their own interests. Parliamentary tools such 
as questions are used in the permanent election campaign between parties: 
parliamentary questions are the continuation of election campaigns by dif-
ferent means. In this article, we seek to extend this understanding of the use 
of parliamentary (oversight) tools by examining to what extent the use of 
parliamentary questions by parliamentary party groups can be explained 
by theories of party competition. In line with theories on issue ownership 
(Robertson 1976), we expect that parties ask questions about topics that they 
focused on in their manifesto (Green-Pedersen 2010): parties use parliamen-
tary questions to maintain and defend their ownership of issues. However, 
issue competition is only one aspect of party competition. Drawing on theo-
ries about negative campaigning (Walter 2014), we propose that parties may 
choose to target or ‘attack’ ministers from parties that they compete with for 
voters, using parliamentary questions to attract negative attention to their 
competitors. This literature at the same time suggests that parties may choose 
to focus their attention on ministers from parties with which they disagree 
ideologically.
We aim to contribute to the understanding of how parties use parliamentary 
tools to further their electoral and policy aims (Bardi and Mair 2008; Green-
Pedersen 2010; Strøm 1990). Focusing on these party-level factors is not just 
important in order to arrive at a more complete understanding of what drives 
parliamentary behaviour, but it is also relevant for political observers, journal-
ists and citizens to evaluate the use of parliamentary questions. After all, the 
right of parliament to question the government is primarily intended to allow 
it to oversee the government. Asking questions of the government may allow 
members of parliaments to be well informed about and scrutinise government 
policies and practices. If these tools are, however, often used as party political 
tools, political observers, journalists and citizens should think about them dif-
ferently: do political parties use their parliamentary oversight tools to check on 
the government or to fight a permanent election campaign?
Given our research aim, we explain not the number of questions asked or 
the topic of the question, but how many questions each party puts to each 
minister. We develop three theoretical expectations, namely that parties ask 
more questions of a minister (1) the more salient that minister’s portfolio is to 
the party; (2) the greater the policy disagreements are between the party and 
the minister’s party; and (3) the stronger the electoral competition is between 
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  3
them. These expectations are tested, drawing on an analysis of parliamentary 
questions in the Netherlands (1994–2014). This country has previously been 
identified as a case of strongly unified party behaviour in parliament, due to its 
electoral system with semi-open list PR in a single national district (Louwerse 
and Otjes 2016). As such, it is an important case to examine to what extent 
questioning behaviour is party behaviour; here we can expect to find these 
effects to be strong and unaffected by other factors that may influence behav-
iour. Our analysis shows that issue saliency, ideological distance and electoral 
competition all contribute moderately strongly to explaining the variation in 
how many questions each party group puts to each minister.
Understanding and explaining the use of oversight tools
Parliaments are expected to play a number of roles in a parliamentary democ-
racy. Parliaments are legislatures that can propose, amend and pass legislation; 
they have important representative and deliberative functions; and, finally, par-
liaments have an oversight function: they are expected to assess and judge the 
appropriateness of government action (Auel 2007: 500). MPs have a number 
of oversight tools at their disposal: parliamentary inquiries, oral questions and 
written questions.
This article examines written questions. These tools are often considered 
symbolic because they are relatively weak. All an MP can do is ask the gov-
ernment to respond to their question concerning some societal issue. The 
government is generally required to provide a written answer, but this can be 
as short as one word. We are interested in written questions, however, because 
they are not necessarily structured by the parliamentary agenda. All other 
tools MPs have at their disposal, like oversight tools such as oral questions or 
legislative tools such as amendments, are limited by the parliamentary agenda. 
There is a limit on the number of oral questions that can be asked during 
parliamentary question time and the speaker has to allow an MP to ask their 
question. An MP cannot propose an amendment to the nation’s tax code on 
their own. That really depends on whether parliament ‒ represented either by 
the speaker or, in many parliamentary systems, the government (Döring 1995) 
‒ is willing to allocate time for a debate on the issue. Even parliamentary speech 
is strictly regulated in most parliamentary systems: agenda setting is usually 
strictly controlled by the government and even in parliaments with strong 
agenda-setting powers, the majority usually controls the schedule (Döring 
1995). Parliamentary questions represent an almost unconstrained form of 
parliamentary behaviour, at least in those systems, such as the Netherlands, 
where there are no limits on the number and subject of the questions that can 
be asked. This allows us to see how parliamentary parties act when uncon-
strained by the parliamentary agenda.
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Issue competition
Students of parliamentary party behaviour have studied parliamentary oversight 
from the perspective of issue competition (Green-Pedersen 2010; Vliegenthart and 
Walgrave 2011). Issue competition is an important concept in the field of party 
politics (Budge 2015; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Petrocik 1996; Robertson 
1976). The key argument comes from Robertson (1976), who showed that parties 
do not necessarily take positions on issues, but promise voters, for example in their 
election manifestos, that they will prioritise some issues over others. This is particu-
larly true for valence issues on which (almost) everybody agrees: high employment, 
economic growth or environmental protection. Some parties have a stronger repu-
tation on such issues: they ‘own’ certain issues (Petrocik 1996; Walgrave et al. 2015). 
As Carmines and Stimson (1989: 6) succinctly put it: ‘[a] ll successful politicians 
instinctively understand which issues benefit them and their party and which do 
not. The trick is to politicize the former and deemphasize the latter’.
A simple, cheap and effective way to maintain issue ownership and direct 
attention to issues on which the party is competent is through parliamen-
tary questions (Green-Pedersen 2010: 350): they provide a way for opposition 
parties to force the government to talk about issues on which the opposition 
considers itself competent and expects the government to be less competent. 
Parties ask more questions about topics they ‘own’ in order to maintain issue 
ownership: they may be used to mark a party’s territory vis-à-vis other parlia-
mentary parties (Walgrave et al. 2015: 789–90). Moreover, they may be used by 
parties to signal to interest groups, party activists, journalists and voters that 
their MPs are ‘working’ on those issues. According to this theory, green par-
ties will ask questions about the environment and radical right-wing populist 
parties will ask questions about immigration. We therefore expect there to be 
a relationship between issue saliency in a party’s manifesto and issue saliency 
in parliamentary questions, i.e. which ministers are asked questions. This pat-
tern may not necessarily be motivated by strategic considerations. Parties that 
talk a lot about issues in their manifestos and in parliamentary questions may 
simply be intrinsically motivated to solve those policy issues. Radical right-
wing  populist parties may genuinely want to solve what they perceive as an 
immigration crisis and may see parliamentary questions as a step in getting 
the government to address it. This brings us to our hypothesis1:
(1)  Issue saliency hypothesis: the more attention political parties spend on 
an issue in their election manifesto, the more parliamentary questions 
political parties will ask about that issue.
Positional competition
We theorise that the use of parliamentary questions is not only a func-
tion of issue characteristics, like saliency, but also of the actors involved. 
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Parliamentary questions are a way to direct (negative) attention towards 
other political players. In that sense, parliamentary politics can be seen as 
the continuation of political campaigning by other means. This is probably 
even stronger for (written) questions than for other parliamentary tools, 
because of the mostly symbolic value of questions. Governments have to 
answer a parliamentary question, but they do not need to take any specific 
policy action (Sánchez de Dios and Wiberg 2011). While there are situations 
in which parliamentary questions do have tangible results, often the asking 
and answering of questions mostly outlines known positions of parliamentary 
parties and governments.
We borrow from the literature on negative campaigning in multiparty sys-
tems to examine which enemies parties choose to ‘go negative on’ (Walter 2014). 
The literature on negative campaigning identifies two different mechanisms. 
First, parties may target or ‘attack’ parties that are ideologically close to them, 
as these ideologically proximate competitors may appeal to the same voters. 
Focusing attention on their failures may be one way to convince those voters 
to jump ship. Second, parties may also want to bring the fight to parties on the 
other side of the ideological spectrum. ‘Going negative’ may reflect actual policy 
disagreements, when parties target their ideological opponents. The evidence 
on this issue is complex. The best research suggests that parties, particularly 
smaller ones, tend to focus on ideologically close parties, but also that when 
one controls for this effect parties tend to target the largest party on the other 
side of the left/right dimension (Walter 2014).
We propose to clarify some of these discussions by distinguishing between 
ideological and electoral similarity. On the one hand, parties are likely to target 
parties that have a similar electorate. The underlying motivation is strategic in 
nature: parties may seek to expose the policy failures of their close electoral 
competitors in order to convince voters not to vote for them but rather to 
switch to the ‘attacking’ party (Haynes and Rhine 1998: 3; Walter 2014: 3). At 
the same time, picking a fight with an ideologically proximate party may be 
unattractive because it may offend the voters who are sympathetic to the party 
(Ridout and Holland 2010: 627; Walter 2014: 3), i.e. exactly those that parties 
sought to attract by such attacks.
Parties could choose to direct their questions to parties that have a different 
policy platform. The underlying motivation could be ideological: parties target 
the parties whose policies they oppose. They simply have more actual substan-
tive policy disagreement with a more ideologically distant minister (Ridout 
and Holland 2010: 627; Walter 2014: 3). The motivation could also be strate-
gic: parties may want to avoid continually picking fights with parties that are 
ideologically proximate because these could be potential government partners 
in the future (Elmelund-Præstekær 2008: 33; Hansen and Pedersen 2008: 21; 
Walter 2014: 4). Moreover, by picking a fight with a party from the other side 
of the ideological spectrum, a party could seek to show voters, interest groups 
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6   S. OTJES AND T. LOUWERSE
and journalists that they offer a credible, but starkly different, policy alternative 
from the parties that are in government.
(2)  Programmatic difference hypothesis: the greater the policy distance 
between a parliamentary party and a minister’s party, the more ques-
tions the parliamentary party will direct to that minister.
(3)  Electoral similarity hypothesis: the more a party’s electorate overlaps 
with the electorate of a minister’s party, the more parliamentary ques-
tions the parliamentary party will direct to that minister.
From a strictly Downsian perspective on party competition (Downs 1957), 
the programmatic difference hypothesis and the electoral similarity hypothe-
sis would seem to be in direct contradiction: parties that stand close together 
are likely also to have overlapping electorates. Because of the characteristics 
of the Dutch system, which we are studying here, these two hypotheses do 
not contradict each other. Voting here is not just structured by a party’s or a 
voter’s left‒right position but also by a voter’s class and religion. This means 
that, for instance, a party like Christian-Democratic Appeal may have a left‒
right  position close to that of the social-liberal Democrats 66, but because the 
Christian democrats appeal to religious voters and Democrats 66 voters are 
secular, their electorates overlap much less than one would expect. Moreover, 
the intensity of the electoral competition between two parties, defined in terms 
of electoral overlap, will also depend on the number of voters that consider 
voting for a party. A party considered by many voters might not actually regard 
a proximate but relatively unpopular party as a particularly important electoral 
competitor. In the dataset we use for our empirical analysis, there is no signif-
icant correlation between electoral competition and programmatic difference 
(r = ‒0.01, p = 0.74).
Control variables
Our analysis is primarily aimed at the party political correlates of asking par-
liamentary questions. We acknowledge that there are other factors that are 
relevant in explaining how many questions each party asks each minister. In 
particular, (1) party size, (2) opposition party status and (3) ‘keeping tabs’ on 
the behaviour of coalition parties may bias the conclusions regarding our main 
independent variables if omitted from the analysis.
Party size is of obvious importance: larger parties can be expected to ask 
more questions. At the same time, smaller parties might be ideologically more 
distant, meaning that our conclusions regarding programmatic differences 
might be due to party size if we do not control for this.
The relations between the executive and legislature are another important 
explanation of parliamentary behaviour (King 1976). We know that oppo-
sition parties are more active in asking questions than government parties 
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  7
(Green-Pedersen 2010; Martin 2011a; Proksch and Slapin 2011; Sánchez de 
Dios and Wiberg 2011). Government and opposition parties have opposing 
interests: the government parties (usually) want to remain within the coalition 
and are unlikely to ‘rock the boat’ by asking parliamentary questions. Moreover, 
even if government parties have genuine policy concerns they can use informal 
means to obtain information or bring government attention to issues due to 
their close relation to the government. Opposition parties, on the other hand, 
have an interest in exposing the policy failures of the government: this draws 
negative attention to the government (Vliegenthart et al. 2013: 394). Therefore, 
we expect that opposition parties will ask more parliamentary questions than 
government parties.
The fact that opposition parties ask more questions than government parties 
does not mean that government parties do not use the tool at all. Coalition 
parties can be expected to focus their questions on their coalition partners in 
order to monitor them (Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Maatoug 2013; Martin and 
Vanberg 2004). They are unlikely to intensely scrutinise their own ministers: 
they are more likely to be satisfied with the policies they propose and have more 
options to address issues informally. Moreover, they do not want to tarnish the 
reputation of their own ministers, who are likely to be prominent candidates 
in the next election. Therefore, we expect that coalition parties will ask more 
questions of ministers who are not members of their own party, compared to 
their own ministers.
Case selection
We study the usage of parliamentary questions by members of the Dutch lower 
house (Tweede Kamer). We approach parliamentary questions from a party 
perspective, despite the fact that recent studies see parliamentary questions as 
a form of individual representation (Bailer 2011; Russo 2011; Saalfeld 2011). In 
order to ensure that the effects we study are attributable to parties and not the 
result of individual incentives for MPs, we select a parliament where we know 
that electoral incentives do not affect parliamentary behaviour and instead 
parliamentary party groups exert control over MPs’ behaviour.
First, Louwerse and Otjes (2016) show that in the Dutch parliament, the 
Tweede Kamer, personalised electoral incentives are practically absent. This is 
because of the combination of the electoral system, the single district system 
and the actual behaviour of voters. The Tweede Kamer is elected in a single, 
national district, through a semi-open list system. Voters have a single vote, 
which they have to cast for a single candidate. Votes are aggregated per party 
in the single district. A party’s seats are filled by the candidates in order of the 
number of votes they received, but only if they received more than 25% of the 
electoral quota. If there are still seats left those go to the MPs in order of their 
list position. Even though every vote cast is a personal vote, these votes hardly 
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8   S. OTJES AND T. LOUWERSE
affect who is elected: between 2002 and 2010, almost 80% of the votes were 
given to the first candidate on the list and more than 90% of the personal votes 
were given to candidates who would have been elected anyway based on their 
list position.
Second, parliamentary parties play a major role in the way MPs operate. 
Parliamentary parties have strong internal organisations. MPs are not so much 
independent agents seeking to advance their own agenda, but rather they are 
their party’s representative on a specific policy portfolio (Louwerse and Otjes 
2015). They are essentially party delegates (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011; 
Mickler 2017: 188; Van Vonno 2012). Within these parties MPs are embedded 
within internal organisations. There is a parliamentary party board or even a 
structure of party committees with the parliamentary party groups: nothing is 
submitted or sent out without prior consultation with this structure (Andeweg 
and Thomassen 2011; Mickler 2017: 191–3). These kinds of structure are not 
just standard practice in the Netherlands, but also in other systems with strong 
parliamentary parties, such as the German Bundestag (Mickler 2017).
Instead of having an individualised electoral incentive to work for their own 
votes, MPs in the Netherlands are embedded within parties. The activities of 
Dutch MPs are likely to reflect their parties’ priorities. Therefore our hypotheses 
and analyses focus on the party level, rather than the individual MP.
We should note that the Dutch case in this respect is different from the 
British or Irish, where stronger individualised election methods, in combination 
with a different organisation of parliament, may lead to the expectation that 
the (opposition) party’s front bench reflect their party strategies in questioning, 
while backbenchers will ask questions mainly to signal to their constituency that 
they are working for them. Still, we believe that analysing the Dutch case will 
contain lessons beyond the particular case. First, the Netherlands is not the only 
system with strong parties and more limited individualised incentives; many 
West European systems have strong parliamentary parties, a clear division of 
labour within them and a semi-open electoral system. It is likely that party-level 
incentives play an important role in the use of parliamentary questions as well. 
Second, the fact that parties are weaker and individual incentives are stronger 
in some systems does not mean that party-level explanations are completely 
useless even in those cases. For example, even when focusing on constituency 
issues, an individual MP might choose to focus on cases that are highly salient 
to their party.
Data and methods
We make use of the official record of parliamentary questions and answers, as 
published in Officiële Bekendmakingen (2015). The dataset runs from 1994 to 
the end of 2014; we exclude the very short 2002–2003 parliament, as normal 
parliamentary operations were hardly established by the time the government 
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  9
resigned. The metadata of the official records include the questioners (MPs) and 
responders (ministers), as well as a topic classification and the date the question 
was asked and answered. The files were downloaded and pre-processed with 
purpose-written scripts.2 The full dataset includes 48,429 questions.
Our unit of analysis is the party‒minister pair per parliamentary period: for 
example, the number of questions the Labour Party (PvdA) asked the Minister 
for Defence in the 2003–2006 parliament. We include all parties for which data 
is available, which excludes split-off parties (as they are not included for our 
electoral and manifesto-based measurement) and some smaller (or short-lived) 
parties, which were not included in the surveys used. Our analysis contains 
1462 party‒minister pairs in total. There is variation in the number of questions 
individual MPs ask (see Online Appendix 1), both between and within parties. 
Except for very small parties, however, we see no evidence of individual MPs 
dominating questioning on behalf of their party. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
party-level patterns might in fact be largely the result of the choices of a few 
individual MPs.
Our dependent variable, the number of questions asked, is measured in two 
ways. Firstly, we look simply at the number of questions put by each party 
to each minister.3 Our statistical model will take differences in the length of 
parliamentary terms and ministerial tenure into account. Secondly, we look at 
the share of questions to a particular minister asked by each party. By focusing 
on the share of questions to each minister, we exclude variation in the number 
of questions asked to each minister, which is not the focus of our analysis. 
Previous analyses have shown that media attention has a large impact on the 
topics covered in parliamentary questions (Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2014; 
Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2011). The second way to measure our dependent 
variable effectively controls for this.4
Our measure of issue saliency is based on manual coding of party manifestos 
for each election from 1994 to 2012. Each paragraph in the manifesto was classi-
fied according to one of the categories of the Comparative Agendas Project. The 
work was done by trained coders. Only those coders were allowed to participate 
who had reached a Krippendorff ’s α of at least 0.80 in their training work. The 
coding work was done in two coding rounds: first, the coders assigned each 
paragraph to one of 21 substantive categories (healthcare, defence, etc.). These 
codes were then reviewed by an expert coder. Next, the codes were split into 
around 10 subcategories per main category (e.g. hospitals or military instal-
lations). This second coding round was meant to assess the correct coding 
in the main categories as well. Inconsistencies were reviewed by an expert 
coder. In a subsequent step, we determined which of these CAP subcategories 
corresponded to each minister’s portfolio. For each party we added up total 
attention to these issues, which effectively means that we arrive at a measure 
of how salient each minister’s portfolio was to each party.5
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10   S. OTJES AND T. LOUWERSE
The programmatic difference between the party of the MP asking a question 
and the party of the minister answering it is based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
estimates (2006 and 2010) (Bakker et al. 2015). We calculated the absolute 
difference between the MP’s party and the minister’s party on the left‒right 
dimension.6
We measured the electoral competition between the MP’s party and the min-
ister’s party in terms of their overlapping electoral appeal. We use the ‘prob-
ability of a future vote’ (PTV) scores available in the Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Study (DPES) (Stichting Kiezersonderzoek Nederland 2010).7 Each 
respondent was asked how likely they were to vote for each party in the future, 
on an 11-point scale from ‘certainly never’ to ‘sometime certainly’. Our variable 
catches the share of voters who said they gave a voting probability of at least 7 
on the 0–10 scale for both parties. For example, in the 1998 election 1429 voters 
gave PvdA or CDA a PTV score of 6 or higher; 402 of them gave both parties 
7 or higher. This translates to 402/1429 = 28.1% overlap. In the same year, the 
overlap between the PvdA and the extreme-right Centre Democrats was only 
18 out of 1157 voters (1.5%). This measures scores high if parties were targeting 
the same group of voters. When the MP asking the question and the minister 
belonged to the same party, we awarded a score of 0 for electoral competition, 
as electoral competition between parties cannot play a role.8
As for our control variables, opposition party is simply a dummy variable 
that equals 1 when a party was in opposition. We do not code the Party for 
Freedom (PVV) as an opposition party during the 2010–2012 term, as it acted 
as a support party to the minority right-wing cabinet Rutte-I. Question put to 
party colleague equals 1 when the MP asking the question and the minister 
answering it belonged to the same party. Party size is measured in terms of the 
logged number of seats; we expect larger parties to ask more questions than 
smaller ones, but that the marginal effect of additional members is expected 
to decrease. Depending on the dependent variable used, some of our models 
contain a variable that indicates the portfolio of the (junior) minister, which is 
manually coded, while other specifications control for the number of parties 
in parliament.9
Our analysis of the data has to take the dyadic (party‒minister) structure 
of the data into account. Therefore, we run multilevel regression models with 
three (cross-classified) levels: the parliamentary term, the party asking the 
question and the individual level. As discussed above, we have two versions of 
the dependent variable. The first is simply the raw count of questions,10 which 
is modelled through a Poisson regression with an offset term for the number 
of days the minister was in office during that particular term, to account for 
between-term differences (some parliaments were longer than others) and 
between-minister differences (some ministers resigned early or took office 
later). We include portfolio dummy variables to capture differences in the pop-
ularity of asking questions to each ministerial department (as a result of media 
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WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  11
attention, for example). We deal with over-dispersion in the model by includ-
ing an individual-level random effect, which is a recommended approach for 
multilevel Poisson models (Elston et al. 2001; Lee and Nelder 2000).11 We run 
this specification both on the full dataset as well as on a dataset that excludes 
government parties asking questions to their own ministers to check the robust-
ness of the results.
Our second set of models captures the share of questions to a particular 
minister asked by each party. We model this using a binomial link in which 
the number of questions asked by the party is the number of successes, and 
the number of questions asked by another party is the number of failures. We 
include the number of parties in a parliamentary term as a control variable 
here, because as the number of parties increases, the average share of questions 
asked by each party drops. Over-dispersion is addressed by including an indi-
vidual-level random effect (Browne et al. 2005). Again we run two versions of 
this model: with and without parties asking questions to their ‘own’ ministers.
Results
On average, parties put about 25 questions to each (junior) minister during 
each of our terms (see Table 1). Taking into account the average length of each 
term, this amounts to just over 10 questions per year. There is, however, huge 
variation: some ministers are not being asked anything by some parties, while 
the Minister for Health received over 118 questions per year from the Socialist 
Party (SP) during the 2010–2012 parliament. Expressed in terms of the propor-
tion of questions to each minister, the average party put 11% of the questions 
to each minister, ranging from 0% to 45%. As an example, our highest value 
is 45, which means that between 2003 and 2006 the Labour Party asked 45% 
of all the questions which were posed to Mark Rutte, who was junior Minister 
for Social Affairs at the time.
We study the correlates of this variation in the multilevel models reported in 
Table 2. As explained, we run two models: one with the raw number of ques-
tions asked as the dependent variable (Table 2, models 1 and 2) and another 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
note: the table only includes valid cases used in the regression analyses.
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max
Questions 1462 25.47 33.35 0.00 15.00 274.00 
proportion of questions asked to minister 1462 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.45 
programmatic difference 1462 2.25 1.64 0.00 2.09 5.81 
electoral competition 1462 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.47 
issue saliency 1462 3.77 3.50 0.00 2.92 24.13 
opposition party 1462 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Question asked to party colleague 1462 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 
party size 1462 16.47 14.16 2.00 11.00 45.00 
number of parties 1462 9.96 1.31 8.00 10.00 12.00 
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with the dependent variable being the proportion of questions to a minister 
being asked by a certain party (Table 2, models 3 and 4). The findings are 
quite similar between models, so we will focus on model 3 in our discussion 
of the results, which is the binomial logistic model of the full dataset. Figure 1 
presents expected values of the dependent variable for different values of our 
independent variables, keeping all other variables at their mean. This helps to 
interpret the size of the effects found.12
The percentage of questions asked increases from 10.4% for non-salient 
issues to 16.3% for highly salient issues, keeping other variables at their mean 
(p < 0.001). This might seem a modest difference, but it does represent a 58% 
increase in questions when moving from the minimum to the maximum level 
of saliency. Moreover, the effect is even more pronounced in the count mod-
els, where we see an increase from 13 to 140 questions asked when moving 
from minimum to maximum saliency levels. This probably reflects that some 
portfolios are more salient to most parties, which is reflected in overall higher 
levels of questions to that minister, even beyond what our portfolio dummy 
variables pick up on. All in all, our analysis shows that parties consistently 
prioritise some issues over others, both in their manifestos and in their par-
liamentary questions.
Table 2. regression models explaining questions asked by parties to ministers.
notes: poisson regression coefficients (models 1 and 2) and binomial logistic regression coefficients 
(models 3 and 4) with standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(intercept) −8.31*** −8.18*** −5.45*** −5.46***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.55) (0.55)
programmatic difference 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
electoral competition 1.16*** 1.20*** 0.96*** 0.94**
(0.33) (0.35) (0.28) (0.31)
issue saliency 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
opposition party 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.73*** 0.72***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
Question asked to party colleague 0.45** 0.34**
(0.15) (0.13)
party size (ln) 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.88*** 0.88***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
number of parties −0.00 −0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
portfolio dummy variables Yes Yes no no
aic 10885.19 9540.80 9907.98 8725.06
Bic 11006.80 9654.50 9966.15 8776.74
log likelihood −5419.59 −4748.40 −4942.99 −4352.53
num. obs. 1462 1297 1462 1297
num. groups: party:period 54 54 54 54
num. groups: period 6 6 6 6
Var: observation (intercept) 0.44 0.44 0.24 0.25
Var: party:period (intercept) 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.12
Var: period (intercept) 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01
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Programmatic differences between the party of the MP asking a question 
and the minister answering it also play a role in explaining the proportion of 
questions asked. Parties ask more questions of ministers they disagree with 
(14.6%) than of those they agree with (9.4%). This effect is statistically signif-
icant at the 0.001 level.
The effect of electoral competition suggests that parties target ministers from 
parties that target the same voters. If there is no electoral overlap at all between 
the questioner’s and minister’s party, meaning that no voters in the election 
study gave both parties a high probability for a future vote, we expect about 
9.8% of the questions to the minister to come from that party, rising to 14.6% 
if there was a high electoral overlap between the parties. This is again signifi-
cant effect at the 0.001 level. The effect remains very similar when we control 
for the (logged) size of the minister’s party (not reported), meaning that this 
is not just a question of targeting the large government parties. Moreover, the 
effect is also replicated when we exclude parties asking questions of their own 
minister from the analysis.
Party size has a significant and large effect: the smallest parties in our data 
(those with two seats) can be expected to put 1.9% of the questions to a minister, 
while the largest parties in the dataset (45 seats) are estimated to put 23.5% of 
Figure 1. expected values of proportion of questions asked.
note: effect plots based on model 3 in table 2. shaded areas/bars display 95% confidence intervals.
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the questions to a minister. This is, of course, not surprising given that these 
parties hold 1.3% and 30% of seats in the parliament, respectively.
Our models show that an individual opposition party asks an estimated 
13.8% of all parliamentary questions of a minister. An average government 
party puts an estimated 7.2% of all parliamentary questions to a minister. When 
we compare opposition and government parties of equal size, the opposition 
party is expected to ask considerably more questions. In addition to this dif-
ference between opposition and government parties, one might also expect the 
impact of issue saliency, programmatic distance and electoral competition to 
be stronger for opposition parties, as they are the ones that stand to gain the 
most by politicising the written questions instrument. When we interact our 
three main independent variables with government or opposition party status, 
we do find a stronger saliency effect for opposition parties, but no difference 
in the effect of programmatic distance and electoral competition (see Online 
Appendix 4). This seems to suggest that in the Dutch case, parliamentary ques-
tions are not only used for party political purposes by the opposition, but by 
government parties as well. We also control for asking a question of a party 
colleague: we find a smaller difference in the proportion of questions put to 
ministers from the same party (14.5%) and from different parties (10.8%).13
All in all, we find strong support for our three hypotheses: the issue saliency, 
programmatic difference and electoral competition hypotheses. This means that 
our overall theoretical expectation of parties focusing their questions based on 
both policy and votes is supported by the analysis of the Dutch parliament.
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that the use of parliamentary questions can be explained 
by the competition between parties, in terms of both policy and votes. We 
observed three key patterns: first, parties use questions to mark their own 
territory. That is, they focus on issues that are salient to them, which in turn is 
likely to strengthen their issue ownership on those topics. This confirms earlier 
work by Green-Pedersen (2010) on the Danish case. Second, parties ask more 
questions of ideologically distant government ministers than of ideologically 
close government ministers. There might be two different mechanisms at work. 
In substantive terms, parties might simply have fewer substantive policy disa-
greements with government parties to which they are closer ideologically. In 
strategic terms, parties are likely to avoid picking fights with parties that after 
the next elections may become their government partners. Our third main 
finding is that parties target their direct electoral competitors in parliamen-
tary questions: this appears to sustain the notion that parties use questions to 
draw negative attention to parties that compete for the same voters in order 
to convince those voters no longer to vote for those parties. This second and 
third result may seem contradictory: parties focus their attention on parties 
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that share the same voters but are ideologically more distant. In order to under-
stand this, one should note that we used the left‒right dimension (dominant 
for policy-making) to analyse the distance between parties and that we used 
the overlap of potential voters to measure the electoral overlap. These measures 
do not correlate because class and religion also play a role in structuring voting 
behaviour. So parties are likely to ask questions of ministers from parties that 
are ideologically distant and parties that are electorally similar.
In line with Maatoug’s (2013) analysis of parliamentary questions in the 
Netherlands, coalition parties seem not to be using parliamentary tools to ‘keep 
tabs’ on their coalition partners. They seem to be putting as many questions to 
their own ministers as to the ministers of other parties. Perhaps this is a para-
doxical consequence of ministerial portfolio allocation: parties will generally 
try to obtain portfolios that are salient to them, which in turn might be a reason 
to ask more parliamentary questions about this issue to signal the importance 
of the issue to voters. Alternatively, government parties might simply have 
better tools at their disposal for intra-coalition checks, such as the allocation of 
junior ministers or bargaining delays in parliamentary committees (Kim and 
Loewenberg 2005; Martin and Vanberg 2004).
All in all, we find more support for the use of parliamentary questions to 
strengthen a party’s own (policy) profile rather than to weaken the position of 
an opponent. Of course, the effectiveness of these strategies depends on whether 
there is an audience for parliamentary questions. One audience is internal to 
the parliamentary arena: parties might use a consistent line of questioning 
on a topic to build up a reputation among other parties, ministers and civil 
servants. There is also an external audience of voters, journalists and other 
external organisations. It is difficult to strengthen ‘issue ownership’ if nobody 
(outside of parliament) knows about the questions. Analysis of the relationship 
between media coverage and parliamentary questions suggests that coverage 
informing (oral) questions is generally more extensive than coverage of the 
actual questions (Van Aelst and Vliegenthart 2014). Still, even written ques-
tions do get reported regularly. Some MPs purposely follow through on a line 
of questioning, asking tens of questions on the same specific issue to ‘mark 
their territory’ within parliament, as well as in media coverage (Schweers 2012; 
Visscher 2006: 95). Further research could expand on this relationship between 
the media dimension of parliamentary questions and the party political side. 
If issue ownership is an important reason for parties to table questions, under 
what circumstances do they succeed in receiving the necessary media attention? 
Another way to extend the party-level analysis of parliamentary questions is to 
look at the inter-party dynamics in asking parliamentary questions: do parties 
respond to other parliamentary parties in terms of the topics they pay attention 
to in parliamentary questions? (Vliegenthart et al. 2011).
Our analysis focuses on the case of the Netherlands, where the party dimen-
sion is arguably more important than the individual level in explaining the use 
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of parliamentary questions. As such, the Netherlands is a likely case in which 
to find these patterns; parties have been shown to matter in systems similar to 
the Dutch one, such as Denmark or Germany (Green-Pedersen 2010; Mickler 
2017). Future research could test to what extent our expectations hold in sys-
tems in which individual-level explanations of parliamentary questioning are 
also pertinent (Martin 2011b). It is likely that for many systems in between the 
extremes of the British system of individual electoral incentives and the Dutch 
system of strong party control and division of labour, there are many systems in 
which both party strategies and individual incentives play a role. In this article, 
we have opted to aggregate all data at the party level. This was justified given 
what we know of the Dutch case, and it yielded clear results. Future research 
may want to study how individual-level incentives and party-level strategies 
interact. A multilevel model that incorporates both individual and party-level 
variables may be justified here. Interesting patterns may be observed in the 
interplay between these two factors: which MPs are more likely to follow the 
priorities that the party laid down in its manifesto and which MPs are more 
likely to ignore them? Perhaps MPs are more likely to ask critical questions of 
ministers from parties with which they are directly competing in their own 
district, rather than the parties that have a greater electoral overlap.
Notes
1.  As our measurement will focus on the issues that are salient to parties, rather 
than the more specific question of which issues they ‘own’, we phrase our 
hypothesis in terms of the former.
2.  We used the Aanhangsels van de Handelingen (‘Supplement to the Official 
Records’) that included both question and answer for all written questions. We 
excluded Mededelingen (‘Announcements’) which stated that questions would 
be answered at a later stage (or that questions were retracted). Note that the 
metadata do contain some errors, particularly when the questioner or responder 
was incorrectly identified or not all of the actors were identified. We matched 
the names in the metadata against a list of MPs and ministers obtained from the 
Parliamentary Documentation Centre (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum 
2010). Still, errors will remain, but are unlikely to affect our analysis greatly 
because of the large volume of questions in the dataset.
3.  A single question can be addressed to multiple ministers, in which case it is 
counted as 1/n-th of a question, where n is the number of ministers. In (the 
infrequent) case of multiple parties asking a question (about 7% of the questions 
in the full dataset were asked by MPs from more than one party), the question 
was counted for each party.
4.  One can also use the number of questions asked of a minister as a percentage of 
all questions asked by a party as the dependent variable (see Online Appendix 
2). This does not, however, control for between-portfolio differences.
5.  Our main analyses exclude six cases with very high saliency scores (>25%), but 
the results are similar when these are included.
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6.  We also employed a measure that looked at the specific issue dimensions that 
are likely to matter for a specific minister (for example, environment for the 
Infrastructure and Environment Minister): we matched each minister’s portfolio 
to one or more of the dimensions available in that survey (Bakker et al. 2015). 
We calculated the mean absolute difference between the MP’s party and the 
minister’s party on the relevant dimensions. When we also included the left‒
right distance measure in our statistical models, the portfolio-specific distance 
seemed not to have any impact. This reinforces earlier findings that in the 
Dutch parliament the left‒right dimension is far stronger than other ideological 
dimensions (Otjes 2011).
7.  We take the electoral competition in the previous elections, for example the 
1998 elections for the 1998–2002 parliament. For the 1994–1998 parliament, 
we use data from the 1998 election study, as this includes the Socialist Party.
8.  Note that our model includes a dummy variable when questioner and responder 
are members of the same party. Therefore, it does not in fact matter whether 
we assign MPs/ministers from the same party a code of 0 or 1 on the variable 
electoral competition. In addition, we replicated our models when excluding 
these cases of the MP and minister belonging to the same party. This does not 
affect the findings regarding the impact of electoral competition.
9.  The names and exact responsibilities of ministries changed over the years, but 
we tried to keep them constant. There are 14 categories for this variable.
10.  Because a question can be asked of multiple ministers (see above), some of the 
counts contain fractions, which we round to the nearest whole numbers. The 
same is true for the binomial link models.
11.  Online Appendix 3 contains alternative approaches to dealing with over-
dispersion in our data. This does not affect the findings presented here.
12.  Note that these ‘effect plots’ only take into account the fixed effects of the model, 
not the random effects.
13.  As our model controls for being an opposition or government party, the 
coefficient for ‘Question asked to party colleague’ can be interpreted directly 
as the effect for government parties.
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